Cogito plus Noetic Monism leads to Solipsism

It is sometimes claimed that the existence of multiple streams of consciousness does not imply a multiplicity of ultimate selves. I do not endorse this claim, as it seems obvious to me that each individual stream of consciousness must belong to a separate self. This is because a self that is not undergoing certain subjective experiences at any given time cannot be identical to a self that is. It does not matter whether we're talking about so-called lower selves or a transcendent Self, because all the selves involved should experience the very same experiences if we want them to be identical.

Now, noetic monism (the theory that there is only one mind) could try the following way out. Perhaps it is simply an illusion that there is a multiplicity of streams of consciousness. Maybe we really only need to believe in our own personal stream of consciousness, as expressed in the Cartesian cogito-argument. We can rationally doubt anything except for the fact that we are conscious subjects who can rationally doubt anything. If we simply do not regard what is usually taken as evidence for other conscious minds as conclusive, we might reason as follows. All behaviour in beings other than myself is caused or accompanied solely by neurological and subconscious processes, never by subjective awareness of any kind. Other beings may have psychological processes, of the kind involved in subconscious multiple personalities of a single self that remain non-conscious, but they can never have their own separate streams of consciousness.

Following my argument, this implies that the only viable type of noetic monism is a form of solipsism: I am the only conscious self. I'm the "God" of the noetic monism of currents like Advaita Vedanta in its only conscious manifestation. All others are, at best, non-conscious multiple personalities of my divine and all-embracing self. The only alternative being that they are simply purely physical manifestation of a completely inanimate matter external to the one and only mind (mine).

I believe anything beyond this would lead to noetic pluralism.

Titus Rivas

Closed-minded dogmatism versus open-minded rationality

In my view, dualists are certainly right to claim victory over (at least mainstream) materialism and physicalism, as no formulation of matter can include the specific qualities of subjective awareness or consciousness nor allow for its (logically necessary) impact on the physical brain.

In practice, many dualists have a spiritual background, and especially in the West it is almost inevitable that many of us are conventional or liberal Christians. Therefore, it is not surprising that several scholars who defend mind-body dualism stress arguments for Intelligent Design as well. However, Intelligent Design is first of all a rational position about evolution, based on argumentation, not a dogmatic reflex based on a particular religious creed.

Skeptics normally view Intelligent Design as Biblical Creationism in disguise, but this is obviously a gross and ignorant over-simplification, because the philosophical argument for a creator is much older than any Christian dogma. It precedes Christianity by centuries or thousands of years. The bare fact that conservative or liberal Christian theologians claim there are good reasons to believe in a God, cannot justify dismissal of these arguments out of hand, not even in the name of a 'rationalist' naturalism.

I really hope that one day we will be intellectually mature enough to regard issues like the solution of the mind-body problem and the right view on evolution (blind mechanism, intelligent design, etc.) as issues that should be approached rationally, guided by open-minded philosophical, rational analysis and empirical data, rather than based on closed-minded theological and naturalist dogma. We have had quite enough of that already and it does not serve any constructive purpose. We need a spirit of intellectual freedom which does not exclude anything just because some dogma would reject it out of hand.

Rationality and closed-minded dogmatism are simply incompatible.
Many scholars realise this when they are confronted by dogmatic conservative-Christian thought, but it equally holds for naturalist or physicalist dogmatism. Let us grow up and go for real intellectual freedom!

Titus Rivas

Hard Problem also applies to Animal Consciousness

One of the nastiest traditions within Western philosophy concerns the Cartesian viewpoint on animals. According to René Descartes animals were nothing more than mindless and soulless automata. To an extent, his extreme view and its inhumane consequences root in the almost universal, traditional contempt of the conservative brands of Christendom for non-human animals.

These unfortunate mainstream Western standpoints on the animal soul concur in the message that animals are radically different from humans, in that they do not possess an immortal soul.

This conviction sometimes affects otherwise rational essays that defend mind-body dualism in the case of human individuals. Even if some (lower) types of consciousness are acknowledged for animals, only the human mind would be the expression of an immortal soul.

The inconsistent part about this is, as was implicitly recognised by Descartes, one cannot rationally conceive of a non-physical consciousness that would be wholely dependent on the brain in most species (including the great apes, cetaceans, or elephants) and ultimately independent only in members of homo sapiens sapiens. This can be demonstrated very easily.

One of the main reasons for believing in dualism in humans is what David Chalmers has called the Hard Problem. Consciousness has certain irreducible qualities that can never be defined in physical terms. It is hard (or impossible) to explain the existence of these qualities (as such) on the basis of brain properties. Now, either a being has conscious - in the sense of subjective, phenomenal and qualitative - experiences or it has not.

In the second case it should be considered some kind of zombie or indeed an automaton as Descartes would say. In the first case, the hard problem as defined by Chalmers certainly applies to the being in question, regardless of whether it is human or not. In other words, either dualism is true for any conscious experient or it holds for none whatever. Starting from the hard problem it is simply baseless to believe it could only apply to human consciousness.

For some this may seem disturbing as they have become accostumed to 2000 years of anthropocentric religious and mainstream 'scientific' thinking. However, we should realise there is much more to the philosophy of the animal mind than misguided conservative-Christian and Cartesian doctrines. For instance, in most of Indian philosophy it has always been quite normal to regard all animals including humans as beings with an immortal soul (in the individual sense as in Dvaita Vedanta or jainism, or in the noetic monistic sense as in Advaita).

Titus Rivas

Do we need a more sophisticated theory of reincarnation?

It is sometimes claimed that some Stevensonian Cases of the Reincarnation Type as studied by dr. Jim Tucker and others may indeed be paranormal (i.e. inexplicable by normal means) but that they certainly need to be explained by a hypothesis that would be more 'sophisticated' than straightforward reincarnation in the sense of the rebirth of a personal soul into a new physical body.
Some scholars are explicitly motivated by philosophical or theological considerations which keep them from accepting 'real' reincarnation. For instance, most Christians and Swedenborgians seem to believe that reincarnation simply does not exist, so that if they do not just want to discount all data of paranormal CORTs they are compelled to explain these data by a more complex non-reincarnative hypothesis. In my view, this is reminiscent of conservative Christian scholars who tried to explain away paleontological findings that suggest evolution by claiming that they were especially created by God to test our faith.
Other scholars simply do not believe in survival after death, because they are convinced that neuropsychological data would rule this out. The mind would depend on the brain to such an extent that it is inconceivable that it would survive brain death. I think these scholars simply are not open to data that could falsify their general theory, such as cases of Near-Death Experience during a flat EEG.
A third group of scholars hold that survival is possible, but they find reincarnation too unappealing or bizarre and therefore 'unacceptable'. They sometimes point to phenomena that superficially resemble CORTs such as claims about children that would be incarnations of a Hindu divinity. If we take a closer look we find that the similarities are very weak, both in terms of statements of the child and in terms of the social context.

As I explain in my lecture Past-Life Interpretations: We Need All of Them, I think there is good, specific evidence for 'real' reincarnation and that it is the simplest interpretation that covers all the facts. For instance, only reincarnation can really explain the children's strong identification with the previous life.

Thus far we do not need a more complex hypothesis, not even if that may seem more 'sophisticated' (and therefore more attractive) to some.

Titus Rivas

Also see: Rebirth and Personal identity: Is Reincarnation an Intrinsically Impersonal Concept?